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DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES ADDRESS BLACK FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS


Nineteen eighty-four is a presidential election year. Already, six members of the Democratic Party have declared their interest in becoming the next President of the United States, and the campaign is in full swing. Despite the black community's historical and growing interest in Africa and the Caribbean, issues relating to these regions have been among those least discussed—if they have not been ignored altogether—during a presidential campaign. Indeed, in previous elections, when candidates were asked to answer specifically Africa- or Caribbean-related questions, they have—more often than not—pleaded for additional time for “further study” of these matters. As a consequence, we have had to choose among candidates not knowing their position on issues vital to our community at large.

But Africa and the Caribbean are unquestionably of increasingly strategic, economic, and political significance to the United States. Southern Africa is now clearly a powder keg, waiting to explode. The Third World debt crisis poses a serious threat to the international financial system. Civil war, revolution, and counter-revolution in the Caribbean Basin also currently confront U.S. policymakers. It is, therefore, important that national debate on the issues affecting these regions take place to the fullest extent possible.


Perhaps, the growing realization of the strength and centrality of the black electorate has been demonstrated by the willingness of the current presidential candidates to break with previous patterns of failing to address black world issues. Each of the declared candidates was asked to respond for the record to eight questions concerning their position on critical foreign policy issues. Five of the six—Alan Cranston, John Glenn, Gary Hart, Ernest Hollings, and Walter Mondale—answered these questions either orally or in writing. Only Reubin Askew was unable to schedule an interview before publication. He has, however, expressed a willingness to answer the questions at a later date.

The candidates have addressed these issues with often groundbreaking observations. Under certain conditions, most of the candidates would impose sanctions on South Africa. Most would recognize Angola. Most would expand dialogue with Cuba. All are critical of current policy toward Grenada and Nicaragua. One would apparently move more forthrightly toward full normalization of relations with Cuba. This special issue of TransAfrica Forum ISSUE BRIEF presents the results of this survey of the candidates as well as a brief biographical description of each.

**Presidential Candidates (front row, l to r);
Walter Mondale, Reubin Askew, John Glenn,
(back row, l to r) Gary Hart, Ernest Hollings.**



Harry Natchayan
The Washington Post



ALAN CRANSTON

Most recent public office: U.S. Senator from California from 1969 to the present Senate minority whip (assistant Democratic leader) since 1977.

Congressional Education Associates Congressional Ledger Rating on Black and Hispanic Interests:
1981: 90 / 1983: 85

Senate Committees: *Foreign Relations* Subcommittees: Western Hemisphere; East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Arms Control; Oceans; International Operations and Environment

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittees: Housing and Urban Affairs; Financial Institutions; Economic Policy, Rural Housing, and Development

Veteran Affairs

Biographical Information:

Born: June 19, 1914 in Palo Alto, California

Education: Mt. View Union High School, Los Altos, CA; Pomona College; University of Mexico; Stanford University, B.A., 1936.

Career: Controller of California 1958-1966; President, California Democratic Council 1953-1957; National President, United World Federalists 1949-1952; Office of War Information, Chief, Foreign Language Division 1940-1944; U.S. Army, World War II; Foreign correspondent, International News Service covering England, Germany, Italy, and Ethiopia, 1937-1933; Author

Recent Election Information: In his last senate race in 1980, Cranston defeated Republican Paul Gann. Cranston won fifty-seven percent of the vote.

Alan Cranston announced his candidacy for President of the United States on February 2, 1983.

If South Africa continues to block progress toward United Nations supervised elections in Namibia and the dismantlement of *apartheid* at home, would your administration support the imposition of comprehensive United Nations sanctions against South Africa? If not, what measures would you be prepared to take?

CRANSTON: Two of our principal objectives in southern Africa are to gain the prompt independence of Namibia and to demonstrate unequivocally to South Africa our opposition to *apartheid*. South Africa's refusal to dismantle this system of legalized racism must end if there is ever going to be peace in southern Africa and if the basic human rights of the vast majority of South Africans are to be met. So far these goals have eluded us.

As President, I would not hesitate to use economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations against South Africa as a tool to end *apartheid* and to win the independence of Namibia.

There are, however, other options short of comprehensive economic sanctions that I would also employ. These other options hold out the promise of significantly affecting South African policy while demonstrating U.S. commitment to its expressed foreign policy objectives. These measures have the advantage of being implemented independently or in concert with other nations. Steps we can take include an embargo on air traffic—an action that would primarily affect white South Africans. We could embargo all nuclear material and information, which would affect the South African nuclear industry that the government depends upon so heavily to supply its energy needs. Instead of relaxing U.S. export controls, particularly for those commodities that can be used for both civilian and military purposes, we could tighten them.

The Reagan administration has failed completely to use this arsenal of options. Instead it has taken the opposite track, offering the South African government a number of benefits in an attempt to gain its cooperation. This policy of "constructive engagement" has failed. There is continued stalemate on the Namibian negotiations. Far from cooperating in bringing peace to the region of southern Africa, South Africa has stepped up its efforts to destabilize other governments in the area through its military incursions into neighboring states' territories. Most important, there is little movement toward ending *apartheid*.

We must forcefully impress upon the present South African government our deep commitment to eliminating *apartheid* and to the independence of Namibia. If our diplomatic efforts fail, then we must take stronger action, including economic sanctions.

The United States is the only major Western power that does not recognize Angola. Would your administration normalize relations with Angola.

CRANSTON: As President, I would move promptly toward recognition of Angola. Refusing to recognize another nation is generally counterproductive and ineffective. U.S. relations with Angola provide a prime example of the problems that develop through non-recognition.

The United States missed a great opportunity to influence the new nation of Angola by refusing it recogni-

Vol. 2, Nos. 5-6

June-July 1983

TransAfrica Forum Issue Brief ©

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Randall Robinson *Executive Director*

ISSN 0730-88X

tion. We helped to increase Angolan reliance on the Soviet Union and its allies. Eight years after Angolan independence, we maintain the charade of non-recognition.

We must live in the real world. We must work with the Angolan government in order to achieve our foreign policy objectives in southern Africa. Angola played a key role as a Frontline State in the negotiations for Zimbabwe's independence. And now Angola is a critical player in the negotiations to bring about the independence of Namibia. In addition, several U.S. companies have major operations in Angola, but they lack the benefit of official U.S. representation in Angola. Despite all these realities, we pretend that Angola does not exist.

It was a mistake not to recognize Angola eight years ago. I see no point in perpetuating what was a poor policy from the start.

Would your administration seek a normalization of relations with Cuba? If not, why not? What else would you propose?

CRANSTON: I believe that since we recognize the Soviet Union—despite our abhorrence of its methods of governing—we should certainly begin a process aimed at establishing relations with Cuba. The fact that we abhor many of Cuba's domestic and foreign policies is no excuse for withholding recognition from this country so close to our shores. As President, I would seek to begin discussions on the bilateral issues, such as trade, that have been outstanding for nearly twenty-five years. The U.S. would certainly benefit from a resolution of the immigration question, as well as U.S. claims on property nationalized following the Cuban revolution. The airline anti-hijacking agreement has been successful. We have been able to reach agreement with the Cuban government in the past, and I am confident that we can work to find some areas of mutual agreement in the future. I strongly believe that improving relations with Cuba could also lessen tensions in this hemisphere.

How would your administration's policies toward Grenada and Nicaragua differ from those of the Reagan administration?

CRANSTON: First of all, I would immediately halt all operations—covert or overt—aimed at overthrowing the government of Nicaragua. We cannot hope to ease the tensions in the region if we are carrying on a 'secret' war against Nicaragua. We must halt the self-defeating 'covert' aid given by the Reagan administration to the remnants of Somoza supporters. This aid serves only to undermine the moderate forces remaining in Nicaragua, and it gives the Sandinistas justification for their otherwise unjustifiable military build-up and heavy reliance on the Cuban military.

I think the Reagan administration has made the same policy mistake with both Nicaragua and Grenada. It has assumed that leftist governments in the Caribbean region are committed to opposing the United States. In the case of Nicaragua, the administration has assumed that a military solution is best. What these operations are really doing is strengthening the group currently in power in

Nicaragua instead of encouraging more moderate elements. Reagan administration policy toward Grenada is not much better. Alarmist pronouncements against that country solidify popular support behind the government instead of encouraging a dialogue between our two countries.

I would like to see the U.S. provide the Nicaraguans and the Grenadans with technical help in areas such as civil works, agriculture, health, and education. There is no reason for us to abdicate these kinds of projects to the Cubans and the Soviets.

And if we are to have peace in the area, I think we must include these countries in regional discussions.

Would your administration support increasing levels of development assistance to Africa?

CRANSTON: Under the Reagan administration, U.S. development assistance to Africa has been placed on a back burner. As in other areas of the developing world, the administration has insisted unwisely on viewing the problems of African nations through the distorted prism of East-West rivalry, emphasizing military assistance over economic aid. Yet the problems that most African nations face were not created by communist subversion and will not be solved by military actions. To reduce developmental assistance now is a short-sighted policy that ignores the inter-dependence of the world economy and the importance of African nations in this system. We should reverse the priorities of the Reagan administration. The United States should step up technical as well as financial assistance to Africa. Trade, an area of critical importance that holds tremendous opportunity for African nations and the United States has been neglected by the Reagan administration. A greater emphasis on trade promotion will provide greater markets for U.S. businesses and will provide African nations with some of the means to ensure sustained economic growth and self-sufficiency.

What is your position on the Caribbean Basin Initiative? In what specific ways would your administration modify it?

CRANSTON: I support the idea of a Marshall Plan type of aid package for the Caribbean Basin. Economic stability contributes to political stability. I think the needs of this region and its importance to the United States have been underestimated for too long. The C.B.I. goes part of the way toward addressing these needs, but there is room for improvement. I have questions about how certain portions of the C.B.I. will affect U.S. jobs, and I will be studying these elements closely before they come up in the Senate. Countries such as Belize and Honduras deserve more aid than the C.B.I. would allot them. I do not think the C.B.I. should be a substitute for security assistance but rather a comprehensive development assistance program. I am concerned that not enough C.B.I. funds are slated for projects which encourage long-term development and that proportionately too much of the C.B.I. is slated for balance-of-payments support, which really only helps in the short-term. I would rather see the ratios changed.

What position would your administration take on African regional conflicts such as the Horn of Africa and the Western Sahara?

CRANSTON: The most constructive role that the United States can play in regional conflicts like those in the Western Sahara and in the Horn of Africa is to help bring about prompt and peaceful settlement of these disputes. A key element of U.S. policy must be recognition of the true individuality of the nations of Africa. Too often U.S. policy has viewed the nations of Africa either as the pawns of East-West rivalry or under the vague generalization of "Africa" as if that explains everything. This is a tremendous disservice both to the United States and to the African nations. It severely limits our effectiveness in implementing U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The origins of the disputes in the Western Sahara and in the Horn of Africa stem from the unique situations of each region. They will require unique solutions. In the Western Sahara we must understand what the needs of the people who live in the Western Sahara are as well as those of our allies in the area. We should try to help end the dispute quickly. It is siphoning off critical resources of all the countries involved, and it is destabilizing the entire region. Significant increases in military aid are not the solution. Hardheaded, serious political negotiations are. We have seen in the Horn of Africa already what huge amounts of military assistance poured into a region can accomplish: it makes the temptation to resort to military solutions overwhelming.

As President, I would ensure that U.S. policy toward regional conflicts in Africa would deemphasize military solutions and encourage resolution through African efforts. To this end I believe that we should encourage and strengthen continued use of forums like the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations.

What specific changes in existing immigration and refugee laws and practice would your administration implement? What treatment would be accorded Haitian and other black refugees?


CRANSTON: I strongly believe that refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution should be eligible for political asylum in the U.S., as recognized in the Refugee Act of 1980. The fairness and impartiality of our refugee policy can be guaranteed only by providing judicial review of asylum decisions. Without this guarantee, individual refugees or classes of refugees are at the mercy of an administration's political or foreign policy goals, as currently with Haitian "boat people."

The discriminatory treatment of these Haitian refugees is unprecedented in our nation's history. These "boat people" risked their lives across 800 miles of ocean to seek safety and a chance for a decent life in the United States. Then, for over a year, 2,000 of these refugees were imprisoned here without bond. The Haitians arrived on our shores unfamiliar with English and largely uninformed about our legal system. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) shuffled them from place to place, often to desolate areas of the country, without admitting legal counsel. It conducted deportation proceedings—including mass hearings—behind closed doors,

with no one to explain their rights or provide adequate translation. It is unjust and cruel for the INS to continue threatening this small group of Haitians with forcible deportation to Haiti, where they face brutality or imprisonment. The uniqueness of their situation and the discriminatory treatment they have already suffered argues that these refugees should receive some form of secure legal status.

Overall, our immigration policy must be fair and workable. It therefore must include international solutions to the problems that create refugees. Our government must devote substantial time, effort, and resources to help Third World nations develop their own economies to provide their people with food, jobs, and the opportunity to achieve a decent standard of living.

Any immigration policy that fails to take into account America's interdependent relationship with other nations is neither realistic nor fair. □



JOHN H. GLENN, JR.

Most recent public office: U.S. Senator from Ohio, 1975 to the present

Congressional Education Associates Congressional Ledger Rating on Black and Hispanic Interests:

1981: 80 / 1983: 60

Senate Committee: *Foreign Relations*, Subcommittees: European Affairs; Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Government Affairs Subcommittees: Energy and Nuclear Proliferation; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Special Committee on Aging
Democratic Policy Committee

Biographical Information

Born: July 18, 1921 in Cambridge, Ohio

Education: New Concord High School (Ohio) 1939; Muskingum College, B.S.

Career: President, Royal Crown International, 1967-1969; Vice President, Royal Crown, 1966-1968; NASA astronaut, 1959-1965 (first American to orbit Earth in spacecraft); U.S. Marine Corps—Colonel, combat pilot World War II and Korean War

Recent Election Information: In his last senate race in 1980, Glenn defeated Republican James E. Betts. Glenn won sixty-nine percent of the vote.

John Glenn announced his candidacy for President of the United States on April 21, 1983.

If South Africa continues to block progress toward United Nations supervised elections in Namibia and the dismantlement of *apartheid* at home, would your administration support the imposition of comprehensive United Nations sanctions against South Africa? If not, what measures would you be prepared to take?

GLENN: The policy of "constructive engagement" which the administration has followed has been a mistake because it suggests we are condoning *apartheid*. That, to me, is wrong. We cannot appear in any way to condone *apartheid*. It also encourages South Africa to feel that they can delay almost indefinitely in negotiating a Namibia settlement, causing a serious deterioration in our relationship with other nations in Africa, particularly in southern Africa. That is the exact opposite of what our objectives should be in that part of the world. We have to keep pressing South Africa to release their stranglehold on Namibia. We have to give priority to improving relations with all the nations of Africa. Accomplishing that goal would require a different direction than the one the administration has been following.

We should be trying to convince South Africa that improving relations is in their hands, not ours. We should not be the ones that are bending over backward to improve the relationship with South Africa. How do you put the sort of policy I advocate into practice? First, I would discourage new U.S. investment in South Africa and urge our allies to do the same. Second, the South African government should be on notice that their continued footdragging with regard to *apartheid* and the Namibia settlement could lead to sanctions at some time. Third, I would launch a very serious search for a Namibian solution as a priority objective of my foreign policy. Fourth, I would enforce strict interpretation of U.S. non-proliferation laws in the nuclear field. I was a principal author of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 because of my concern about nuclear weaponry spreading to more and more countries around the world. Of course, South Africa has refused to abide by what we were hoping to accomplish with that law by putting everything under international atomic agency safeguards.

Fifth, I would also, as a priority, develop an outreach program in sub-Saharan Africa, trying to develop our political dialogue with these countries by designing an effective long-term economic assistance program. It is impossible for us to do everything that those nations would like to have us do it the way of an economic program, but certainly it can be more coherent and a better program than we have had to date.

Finally, I would be more active in promoting black advancement, politically and economically, by supporting organizations working for peaceful change in South Africa. We can have a role to play in education, training and travel grants, labor unions, legal defense aid, and other public interest organizations. I am very interested, for example, in the black labor union movement in South Africa. A recent ABC television special indicated that these unions now have some 18,000 members. That is a very good step forward, which shows organizing ability and the development of a power source that can be a very major influence in the future.

Unless we move our South Africa policy in some of these directions and do it soon, there is a real possibility

of a violent and a bloody explosion in South Africa. It has been a long time coming. Black South Africans are not going to remain in the position that they are in and suffer as they have suffered for the indefinite future. So, I hope that whatever influence we can have there we can mold into a more positive direction than it now appears to be heading.

The United States is the only major Western power that does not recognize Angola. Would your administration normalize relations with Angola?

GLENN: As a general principle of foreign policy, I favor maintaining contact with other nations, whether we agree with them on everything or not. When we in effect cut communications and cut all relationships—unless it is a nation that really provokes us to a great degree—then we make a mistake. We should maintain some kind of contact and some kind of dialogue. That certainly would be the case with Angola. Normalizing relations with Angola is probably long overdue. We will continue to have our disagreements because I certainly don't condone the involvement of Cubans in that country. But looking at the situation almost solely in terms of an East-West confrontation as the current administration does is not the way to achieve a peaceful resolution to the situation.

Recognition of Angola is a step also in freeing Namibia of South African domination and removing the Cubans from Angola. The Angolans have given assurances that the Cubans would be withdrawn under these conditions. Perhaps, we should accept these assurances and be the ones to take the first step and agree to recognize Angola. That is a step I would be willing to take. We would have a number of options open if the Angolans did not ask the Cubans to leave or if the Cubans refused their request. Whatever occurred after recognition, we certainly would be in no worse position than we are now. And there always is the chance that the Angolans would ask the Cubans to leave and that the Cubans would comply. This certainly would remove any reasons that the South Africans would have for further delaying the Namibian settlement.

Would your administration seek a normalization of relations with Cuba? If not, why not? What else would you propose?

GLENN: Cuba is a special problem. Not only is it only ninety miles from our shores, but I also cannot condone Cuban troops meddling around on behalf of the Soviets all over the world. In Central America—El Salvador particularly—the flow of arms is in part coming from Cuba; and that certainly is not in the best interests of the United States. I am very concerned about Cuba's close ties with the Soviets, including even the presence of Soviet troops—which we monitor on a regular basis—on the island itself. Despite my concerns about Cuba, I do not like this administration's dangerous and loose talk of going to the source. Early in this administration, they even talked about blockading Cuba. I cannot think of anything that would be more counterproductive. When we talk about blockading Cuba, we should be very careful as to not create a situation in which the Soviets would call our

bluff. Such an approach only makes matters worse.

On the other hand, to say that the Cubans are the source of all the problems in Central and South America is also ridiculous. If they were not involved, there still would be major problems in Central and South America.

Despite our differences with the Cuban government, I once again feel that we should be carrying on a dialogue. I do not like to see confrontations grow and grow. Although I do not favor recognition at this time, we can have some sort of dialogue back and forth even with nations with whom we disagree.

My views would be very similar to those of the Carter administration. We should encourage Cuba, perhaps through our discussions with them, to stop some of this meddling that they do on behalf of the Soviets. I certainly cannot condone what they have done, but if we expect to have some sort of peaceful resolution and some sort of resumption of normal ties some time in the indefinite future, then we have to keep some form of dialogue going with them.

How would your administration's policies toward Grenada and Nicaragua differ from those of the Reagan administration?

GLENN: We obviously have very serious differences with Nicaragua. Their revolution has turned out to be far more totalitarian in nature and much more restrictive than many first thought. At the same time they have expanded their military capability dramatically. We should be greatly concerned by the support for and the pass through of arms to guerillas in El Salvador.

The administration has sought to isolate Nicaragua and to support covertly military forces operating in Nicaragua. I am not sympathetic with the direction that the Sandinista government has taken, and I am opposed to their arming and supporting guerillas in El Salvador. But I am also opposed to arming right wing guerillas that we do not have control over or cannot guarantee their behavior. A group like that, once armed, may change their objectives.

Honduras has had an interest in making certain that arms do not flow through it to El Salvador. Perhaps, rather than our getting directly involved with groups that might or might not be under our control, we might be well advised to give greater support to Honduras. It is possible that they can handle this situation better than we can with our attempts to arm anti-Sandinista guerillas.

I also believe a lessening of tensions in the region is desirable. The U.S., for example, should be more receptive to regional peace initiatives of other key nations in the region. Moreover, we should not close the door to communications with Nicaragua. While we should continue to insist on a cessation of arms and supplies to Salvadoran guerillas, we should consider as a *quid pro quo* the cessation of U.S. support for the anti-Sandinista paramilitary forces and assurances that we have no designs on Nicaraguan territorial integrity.

Despite the seriously deteriorated state of our relations, I do not believe we should abandon the field to the Cubans. We may be totally unsuccessful in reaching any acceptable resolution of outstanding differences with the Sandinistas, but it should not be for lack of trying.

Grenada also bothers me because of the pattern of ex-

panded military activity on the island—not just the airport, but other activity as well. It is not clear to me what is happening there and in Suriname. Both nations' relations with Cuba and Cuban intentions in the eastern part of the Caribbean are not clear as yet, but they certainly raise some troubling questions. They may both be part of possible Cuban expansion into the region. As far as Grenada is concerned, we will have to wait and see. I do not like, however, the possibility of another island being taken over and placed under almost direct Cuban supervision or intervention, which appears to be what has happened there. The situation is a little less clear in Suriname.

Would your administration support increasing levels of development assistance to Africa?

GLENN: Africa has tremendous problems of poverty, poor health conditions, and illiteracy. Obviously, anything that we can do to reduce these problems should be done. We have a humanitarian, economic, and strategic stake in the development of the Third World.

Economically, we are in an increasingly interdependent world; and we play a very major role in the world economy. Our commercial links to the Third World have been expanding tremendously. We can no longer live in isolation in America whether we want to or not. Our increasing trade with the Third World is very, very important. It is also a big market for our exports. So when there is instability, civil strife, war, or revolution in the developing world, it certainly runs contrary to U.S. economic and security interests.

In contrast to the present administration, I believe that political injustice and economic deprivation are the root of most of the unrest across Africa and the rest of the developing world today. When that is the case, the Soviets are likely to move in and maximize these difficulties for their own purposes. Sometimes they have succeeded, sometimes they have not. So it is in our interests to give as much as we can in humanitarian and economic aid. It is the right thing to do, and it also protects our strategic interests in that part of the world.

The resources that we put into foreign development assistance have been falling as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) in recent years. I am not particularly proud of that. Of the industrialized nations of the world, we are now in thirteenth place in terms of the percentage of GNP that we give to these purposes. Meanwhile, if African nations are to be able to work their way up the ladder a little bit, their development needs remain very critical.

Despite these trends, this administration has sought to shift the relative mix of our scarce resources away from economic aid and more toward military aid. A higher percentage of U.S. aid is going to military aid to the detriment of true development assistance. I would like to see a reversal of that trend. I supported an amendment to shift \$92 million out of FY 1984 foreign aid funds from military aid to genuine development assistance accounts.

We should also make use of the people we have. In past hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee, I have made a point of questioning our A.I.D. and State Department staffs concerning better utilizing the people of this country that have cultural ties to the developing world. We have a rich diversity of people in this country that

we could make better use of in our foreign policymaking. It seems to me that our goal should be policies that help people most in the Third World.

What is your position on the Caribbean Basin Initiative? In what specific ways would your administration modify it?

GLENN: I supported the thrust of the administration's C.B.I. proposal. The political stability in the Caribbean, as in other regions of the world, is very much a question of economic stability. I supported the \$350 million in additional economic aid that was part of the C.B.I. proposal. I doubt, however, that a one-shot proposal, such as the C.B.I. plan, is effective in the long-run. We need a longer-range, on-going program so that we can have a lasting impact. I, therefore, supported Senator Dodd's proposal to change the nature of C.B.I. aid, making it a permanent economic development facility and putting it under the auspices of an institution like the Inter-American Development Bank. The banks in their loan programs and in the projects that they have supported take a very tough, hard-nosed view. They are trying to insure long-term development for the people of the region. I supported Senator Dodd's proposal because I think our aid could be more effectively developed and administered by the regional banking institutions. Then we would be in a better position to ask for contributions from other donor countries who would be more willing to cooperate.

I amended the C.B.I. aid legislation to express a sense of the Senate that in order to reinforce the economic development goals that we have embraced in the C.B.I. we must negotiate replenishment of and increase the resources of the Inter-American Development Bank's fund for special operations, which was the principle source for concessional lending for some of the same Caribbean Basin countries.

However, there are some problems with the C.B.I. concept in terms of the duty-free treatment of Caribbean Basin goods. We need to look at that very carefully and to fully assess the trade benefits for the Caribbean nations as well as the impact on U.S. jobs and the industries which are going to be hit the hardest. We need to make that kind of assessment and to include strong protections against pass-through industries that might invest not for the development of those countries, but as a means to gain access to the U.S. market through a pass-through operation. We must institute some form of protection against that type of operation.

What position would your administration take on African regional conflicts such as the Horn of Africa and the Western Sahara?

GLENN: We cannot dictate what is going to happen in those areas. When regional conflicts like the Horn or the Western Sahara occur, we ought to push as hard as we possibly can for peaceful resolution. We ought to be the catalyst that gets the parties together and gets discussions going that could lead to peace. The model for that is the Camp David talks which set the conditions for peaceful discussions. While I am not proposing a Camp David proposal for every conflict around the world, we want to be

the peacemaker in these situations. We want to be the one that tries to suggest everything possible, short of U.S. direct intervention; and we want to make certain that peace can be negotiated if at all possible.

In the cases of both the Horn and the Western Sahara, perhaps we should operate in conjunction with the O.A.U. and get them to take a more active part in mediating and seeking a negotiated settlement. When we put weapons into these areas, we should make certain that they are defensive weapons. I am not arguing that we should not give weapons to those nations that have been our friends, but we should not arm a country for offensive warfare against its neighbor in either the Horn or the Western Sahara.


What specific changes in existing immigration and refugee laws and practice would your administration implement? What treatment would be accorded Haitian and other black refugees?

GLENN: The Senate has just been going through a review of immigration policy for the first time in more than twenty years. We have had tremendous changes in the openness of our borders, notably in the southwest—a significant development which has impacted directly on U.S. immigration policy. Each year we have not only thousands, but hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants come into our country—understandably to escape poverty, injustice, human rights violations, and civil strife in their countries. We have had a particularly heavy burden placed on us because we have been the nation to which most people would prefer to come. So, our immigration laws have needed a very thorough going over.

I support in general the Simpson-Mazzoli Immigration Reform Bill. It strikes a reasonable balance between the problems of asylum and tenure for those who have been in our country for a period of time—more specifically, for those who have been here since 1972, including a significant number of Haitians who have tried to or have entered the United States seeking political asylum. If refugees came to this country fearing persecution based on race, religion, or nationality, or because there is a danger to them if they were forced to return, obviously we have to fulfill this obligation or asylum without reference to race or any nationality concerns.

The opportunity for judicial review is an important safeguard in this right to asylum, and it would not be overly burdensome to our judicial system. I supported last year and will support this year an amendment to the Immigration Reform Bill (Simpson-Mazzoli) which retains the current right of judicial review of asylum cases.

I have talked with Charlie Smith, who was the Deputy Director of the N.A.A.C.P. and its task force on refugee problems in Florida, now a member of my staff, about the problems facing the Haitians and other refugees. This has reinforced my view that, as a matter of principle, the policy of detaining asylum applicants is appalling, has not been practiced evenly, and has been carried out in a discriminatory manner. Recently, the Appellate Court upheld the finding that Haitians are treated in a discriminatory fashion. Therefore, the question has been taken out of the policy arena; and that is good. It is a development I strongly endorse. □



GARY HART

Most recent public office: U.S. Senator from Colorado from 1975 to present.

Congressional Education Associates Congressional Ledger Rating on Black and Hispanic Interests:
1981: 95 / 1983: 100

Senate Committees: *Armed Services*, Subcommittees: Military Construction; Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Forces; Sea Power and Force Projection
Budget

Environment and Public Works, Subcommittees: Environmental Pollution; Nuclear Regulation; Toxic Substances and Environmental Oversight

Biographical Information:

Born: November 28, 1937 in Ottawa, Kansas

Education: Bethany College (Okla.); Yale Divinity School; Yale University Law School, 1964

Career: National Campaign Director, McGovern for President 1971-1972

Practiced law in Denver

Lecturer at the University of Colorado Law School
Special Assistant to U.S. Interior Secretary Stewart Udall
Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice
Chairman, National Commission on Air Quality

Recent Election Information: In his last senate race in 1980, Hart narrowly defeated Republican Mary Estill Buchanan. Hart won by fifty percent to forty-nine percent.

Gary Hart announced his candidacy for President of the United States on February 17, 1983.

If South Africa continues to block progress toward U.N. supervised elections in Namibia, and the dismantlement of *apartheid* at home, would your administration support the imposition of comprehensive United Nations sanctions against South Africa? If not, what measures would you be prepared to take?

HART: A fundamental goal of U.S. policy towards South Africa must be support for the human rights and civil liberties of all the people of South Africa. *Apartheid* is a spiritually corrosive and politically destructive system which can only lead to the ultimately destruction of the South African nation. That is not in our interests no matter how one measures it. A peaceful, politically settled

South Africa will, in the long-run, contribute more to the protection of U.S. national and strategic interests in Africa than would short-term concessions by the United States to the *apartheid* regime in the name of political expediency.

Sanctions can be useful if they are applied judiciously and thoughtfully. To be effective, they must be coordinated with other concerned states and particularly with those people we want to help in South Africa. We should not support sanctions on South Africa that are opposed by the victims of *apartheid*. Even if other nations do not support sanctions, we can give a clear signal to the government of South Africa that we will not help rescue it from the consequences of its *apartheid* policies.

Giving assistance to grassroots black enterprises, organizations and projects such as schools, clinics, and businesses, can demonstrate our moral as well as financial backing for the victims of *apartheid*. It can be done quietly or publicly. But it must be done in such a manner that the government of South Africa and, more importantly, black South Africans in need, know that we are helping. But by focusing our attention on the assistance, rather than on the attention we can generate for ourselves, we will project an even more important message: the object of our policy is to help those in need, not self-aggrandizement.

In our dealings with the South African government, we should absolutely forego any U.S. government financial aid, loans, trade, or support for South Africa's nuclear industry. We should not provide any aid, including technology, which is to be used for military or police suppression of the South African population. The recent approval by the Reagan administration of the sale of electric cattle prods to the South African police is an example of the inexcusable and immoral support for repression which must be stopped.

Finally, we should put into effect legislation similar to that proposed by Congressman Solarz of New York requiring that all U.S. firms operating in South Africa engage in fair employment and wage practices.

The threat of U.S. sanctions has kept South Africa bargaining with the Contact Group of nations over the procedures for free election and the establishment of self-government in Namibia. The policy outlined above would go well with efforts to convince the government of South Africa of our seriousness in supporting a free Namibia, just as it would convey clearly our rejection of the *apartheid* system.

The U.S. is the only major Western power that does not recognize Angola. Would your administration normalize relations with Angola? If not, why not?

HART: Current U.S. relations with Angola reflect an apparent Reagan administration decision to reinforce relations with South Africa at the expense of other African nations. The Reagan policy, linking South African withdrawal from Namibia to the Cuban withdrawal from Angola, was ostensibly directed at improving chances for a settlement in 1982. Instead, confrontation between South Africa and Angola has increased, and Pretoria has interpreted the support of the Reagan administration as giving it *carte blanche* to push for even greater regional hegemony. It is time to reconsider the linkage question

in terms of current realities.

Recognition of a foreign government does not in itself mean we condone its behavior or support its policies. Recognition means we agree that a government has an international legal status and represents the legal and political authority in a country. Normalized relations between the United States and Angola could be mutually advantageous. It would show that U.S. willingness to deal with African nations, particularly black African nations, on the basis of individual legitimacy and a commitment to international human rights as well as economic interests, is not permanently distorted by our ties to South Africa.

Even in the absence of formal diplomatic relations, such U.S. companies as Gulf Oil, Boeing Aircraft, Cities Services, and Chase Manhattan Bank have garnered a trade partnership with Angola amounting to several hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Not until the United States abandons its hostility toward the MPLA regime, however, is Washington likely to establish a constructive dialogue with Luanda on the removal of Cuban soldiers in Angola. Furthermore, the MPLA government will continue to resist expelling the Cubans as long as its security is imperiled by South African attacks.

Would your administration seek a normalization of relations with Cuba? If not, why not? What else would you prefer?

HART: I do not in any way condone the Castro government's policies. Cuba has no business sending armies to Africa or meddling in the affairs of its Central American and Caribbean neighbors. Castro's belligerent attitude towards the United States and his attempt to use our country as a scapegoat for the failure of communism to solve Cuba's economic and social woes is unjustified and offensive.

That said, Cuba is less than 100 miles off our coast. And whether we approve of its behavior or not—and I do not—we cannot ignore Cuba's presence or its potential for creating mischief in the Caribbean area.

We should, for the time being, maintain contacts through the U.S. Interest Section in Havana. It can be in our mutual interest to expand and develop relations. The extent to which that will be possible will depend a great deal on the attitude of the Castro government. For our part, we are not going to resolve our conflicts with Cuba overnight.

Hopefully, over the longer term, our relations with Cuba will improve. This will require positive action by both sides. The United States should be prepared to initiate and respond to positive overtures to set that action in motion.

How would your administration's policies toward Grenada and Nicaragua differ from those of the Reagan administration?

HART: My policies toward Central America and the Caribbean would differ dramatically from those of the current administration. First, I would set the priorities differently. Our first goal should be to support the growth of democratic political and social institutions in the

region. This means putting pressure on the left *and* the right to curb abuses of power and to encourage both sides to accept the consequences of a genuine democracy.

The establishment of Marxist regimes in Nicaragua or El Salvador is not in our interest. I am distressed by the continuing drift toward repression in Nicaragua. The Sandinista government has closed the opposition press, postponed elections, and purged its more democratic members from key posts in the government. Nicaragua continues to interfere in the Salvadoran civil war. That must stop.

At the same time, we cannot forget the excesses of the right wing Somoza government that pushed Nicaragua into revolt. We are in danger of making the same mistake in El Salvador. The Reagan administration has been quick to point to Nicaragua and is correct in saying the rebels in El Salvador could be even worse. But in the name of anti-communism, this administration has been prepared to accept, ignore, and at times even excuse the anti-democratic, repressive, and even terroristic practices of the Salvadoran right.

U.S. policy should be designed to bring the disputing parties together, rather than driving them apart. Harsh rhetoric and a commitment to a military solution is not likely to bring peace to the region any time soon. We cannot solve Central America's problems if we refuse to talk to the parties involved and if we engage in covert efforts to subvert and overthrow one of the parties in the dispute.

We should be secure enough in our own position, and our own power, that we do not feel threatened by the prospect of discussions with the Sandinista government. If we want to exert a positive influence on its actions, however, we must pursue a course of correct, no-nonsense diplomatic contact. The Reagan administration's confrontational approach, involving support for the armed overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, restriction of trade and diplomatic contact, and the use of harsh rhetoric can only exacerbate relations. The Reagan policy is likely to drive the Nicaraguans even further into the Cuban /

Soviet orbit. It also gives a clear and unmistakable signal to every other nation in the region that we are unwilling to rely on the rule of law and the normal international diplomatic processes to resolve our disputes. The Reagan policy suggests that we look first to the use of military force rather than keeping it as a last resort.

The Reagan administration has reacted as if America's national security is threatened by Grenada, a nation which is smaller than Fairfax County, Virginia. If we want to keep Grenada out of the Soviet orbit we should adopt policies designed to encourage better relations with democracies rather than pursuing a course of action which pushes Grenada towards Moscow by way of Havana.

Would your administration support increasing levels of development assistance to Africa?

HART: In the past, the United States has provided a great deal in foreign aid to Africa and other parts of the developing world. Unfortunately, this has often been offered only when the recipient country has been in the throes of civil war or is the victim of a perceived communist threat or has experienced a natural disaster.

My administration will seek to correct this problem by offering foreign assistance on a consistent long-term basis—not only when crises arise. Second, I will insist that economic aid be directed to the most impoverished members of the society and focus less on military or security assistance.

The level of aid to Africa will obviously depend on the state of the U.S. economy and our assessment of the specific problems confronted by African nations. Africa is a continent endowed with tremendous resources and has great economic potential. An American aid policy incorporating training, economic assistance, and the introduction of appropriate technology, directed toward the economic development of Africa will help the African people as well as the United States.

What is your position on the Caribbean Basin initiative? In what specific ways would your administration modify it?

HART: U.S. aid programs should be designed to meet the needs of the people in countries and regions where they are being implemented. The President's Caribbean Basin Initiative does not do that satisfactorily. It confuses the Caribbean, which has one set of economic problems, with Central America, which has a very different set of economic and political problems. To compound the problem, the Reagan administration has used the purported vehicle of the C.B.I. to push large amounts of military aid—primarily intended for Central America—through Congress. Thus, the C.B.I., which is billed in public as a major economic program for the Caribbean, turns out to be largely military aid for Central America.

My first step would be, therefore, to design an economic and commercial program specifically for the Caribbean, which would take into account the following points:

- our special responsibilities for and need to be sensitive to the economies of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands;

- the similarity of many of the economies in the region, which discourages trade among the nations of the Caribbean and requires a search for markets outside the region;

- the need for the program to be developed jointly with the leaders of the governments, industry, and commerce in the region to ensure that the goals we are furthering have the support of those sections; and

- our own domestic concerns.

Our economy is big enough to provide some additional markets for Caribbean goods. Many of the proposals in the President's Caribbean Basin Initiative—the trade and investment incentives in particular—could have a positive effect for the Caribbean. In implementing a Caribbean Trade and investment policy, however, special care needs to be taken to protect the rights of workers in the Caribbean and in the United States. The programs must be designed to stimulate real growth in the Caribbean and not to turn small Caribbean economies into transmission points for exports manufactured outside the region.

In addition to encouraging these portions of the CBI, the United States should work with Caribbean nations to develop their trade potential with other parts of the world to break economic and commercial dependence on

the U.S. market. Breaking that sense of dependence would not only be economically healthy for our Caribbean neighbors, but psychologically and politically healthy as well. Finally, we should encourage continued economic assistance through multilateral lending institutions and development programs. Our primary concern should be to assist them to establish a sense of economic and political autonomy, self-respect and independence.

What position would your administration take on African regional conflicts such as the Horn of Africa and the Western Sahara?

HART: Encouraging the polarization of the crisis by assuming that one side is "right" or "wrong," or jumping to the conclusion that the hand of Moscow had stirred up every case of civil and social unrest is counterproductive. Regional conflicts are generally caused by deep-seated, complicated regional problems. While the Soviet Union and its allies may take advantage of the situation to further their goals, they are seldom the cause of the problem. Similarly, it is almost never the case that the fault for regional disputes lies entirely with one side or the other.

Mediation by regional organizations, interested but impartial neighbors, or even outside nations acceptable to the parties in the dispute should be supported whenever possible.

When appropriate, the U.S. should be prepared to entertain a request for the use of its good offices in bringing about a peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. U.S. diplomacy should *assist* in such an effort and not take sides in the dispute or in any other way act to undercut the efforts of local and regional organizations.

What specific changes in existing immigration and refugee laws and practice would your administration implement? What treatment would be accorded Haitian and other black refugees?

HART: The United States has a historic tradition of accepting those people who have been driven from their homes by oppressive governments or who have been the object of persecution. Our country has demonstrated many times over that those who have been rejected by other nations can grow in freedom and contribute to the establishment of a healthy, diverse, and vibrant society.

Sadly, in the past few years, American willingness to accept refugees from other lands has declined. Economic conditions have played a role, to be sure. It is harder to accommodate large numbers of immigrants when jobs are scarce. Americans *have* become less willing in recent years to accept groups of refugees and asylum seekers who are different—different in race, in tradition, in creed.

I am firmly committed to coordinated foreign and refugee politics. My article, "Immigrants and the New Bill," which appeared in the August 24, 1982, *New York Times* was written to stimulate thought and to draw attention to the need for consensus in this most important area.


Three very important steps must be taken if the U.S. is to address successfully and fairly the problem posed by the large numbers of people coming to our shores seek-

ing asylum and refuge. First, we must ensure that our domestic policies provide equal economic opportunity to everyone. Second, our foreign policy, especially our economic and assistance policies, must be aimed at resolving those social and economic ills which compel people to abandon the land of their birth. Finally, we must guarantee the consistent application of the Refugee Act of 1980, which provides for uniform procedures for determining individual cases of asylum.

The case of the Haitian refugees is particularly graphic. Although they cannot possibly think they have entered the "golden door" of economic and social opportunity, they continue to come. Life in the United States, either as illegals or in refugee camps, is hard. But it is obviously preferable to a life where social and economic opportunity are systematically denied. Until Congress and the American people face this fact, it will be difficult to control the flow of immigrants. Specifically, we need to recognize that our tacit support of repressive regimes like that of Duvalier in Haiti will be paid for in an influx of "boat people."

Unless we do our part to assist in worldwide efforts to aid displaced and oppressed peoples, we will not be in a position to argue that other states in Africa or elsewhere should combat the root causes of human suffering.

We should be clear about one last thing. We cannot, in the long-run, accept all of the world's poor and oppressed. The political and economic strains on our country would be too great. To the extent that we decide, however, that we must set limits on how many oppressed and persecuted people we are able to accept within our borders, we must accept the moral consequences of our act and be prepared to extend a helping economic hand to those who suffer wherever they may be found. □



ERNEST F. HOLLINGS

Most recent public office: U.S. Senator from 1966 to the present

Congressional Education Associates Congressional Ledger Rating on Black and Hispanic Interests:

1981: 60 / 1983: 65

Senate Committees:

Appropriations, Subcommittees: Defense; Labor; Health and Human Services; Education; State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary; Energy and Water Development; Legislative Branch

Budget (Ranking Minority Member)

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittees: Communications; National Ocean Policy Study

Biographical Information:

Born: January 1, 1922 in Charleston, SC

Education: Charleston public schools; The Citadel, B.A., 1942; University of South Carolina, LL.B., 1947.

Career: Governor of South Carolina, 1959-1963;

Lt. Governor of South Carolina 1955-1959;

South Carolina General Assembly 1949-1953;

U.S. Army Captain World War II;

Attorney, Hoover Commission;

Author: "The Case Against Hunger—A Demand for a National Policy," 1970.

Recent Election Information: In his last senate race in 1980, Hollings defeated Republican Marshall Mays. Hollings won seventy percent of the vote.

Ernest Hollings announced his candidacy for President of the United States on April 18, 1983.

If South Africa continues to block progress toward United Nations supervised elections in Namibia and the dismantlement of *apartheid* at home, would your administration support the imposition of comprehensive United Nations sanctions against South Africa? If not, what measures would you be prepared to take?

HOLLINGS: Yes, at this point I would support such sanctions. Unfortunately, the policy of "constructive engagement" has not worked. Recent developments in Namibia make it clear that our approach with South Africa has not led to the desired result. Economic sanctions are not a desirable policy of first choice. The present situation, however, leaves us with few alternatives.

The United States is the only major Western power that does not recognize Angola. Would your administration normalize relations with Angola? If not, why not?

HOLLINGS: Although I look forward to the normalization of relations at the soonest possible opportunity, I oppose the normalization so long as Cuban troops remain in Angola.

Would your administration seek a normalization of relations with Cuba? If not, why not? What else would you propose?

HOLLINGS: For there to be a meaningful change in our relations with Cuba, there would have to be a clear demonstration of good faith from Cuba. Its conduct in Africa, in Central America, and in other trouble spots is what prevents progress toward normal relations. I would welcome a demonstration of changed attitude.

How would your administration's policies toward Grenada and Nicaragua differ from those of the Reagan administration?

HOLLINGS: I oppose the "covert" operation in Nicaragua. It is not covert and does not make sense. Throughout Latin America, we have ignored problems of long standing and found ourselves, in the absence of

any sensible and consistent policy, reacting with strategies of last resort. Our emphasis should be on strategies that build solid relationships with our neighbors and prevent crises by focusing on productive social and economic policies.

As for Grenada, it seems that after years of complacency and interest in little more than that island's nutmeg, we have suddenly discovered its strategic importance. This is another example of our on-again, off-again, stop-and-go Latin American policy. We neglect the area until a crisis develops, and then we find we have no foundation to build on.

Would your administration support increasing levels of development assistance to Africa?

HOLLINGS: I support development assistance on a selective basis, targeted at clearly identified needs and goals. In the past, we have allocated money with little regard for effective use. Assistance on the basis of a blank check is wasteful and we cannot afford it. As for the appropriate level of assistance, that should be established by an assessment of need. I would not want to predetermine the answer to such a review at this point.

What is your position on the Caribbean Basin Initiative? In what specific ways would your administration modify it?

HOLLINGS: The Caribbean Basin Initiative, for which I voted, is a step in the right direction. However, it is not sufficient and cannot substitute for a thoughtful and consistent policy supporting economic development in all of Latin America. We need to focus on the development of solid, viable infrastructure, establish long-term objectives, and approach them with enough flexibility to respond to the diverse conditions prevailing in the region.

What position would your administration take on African regional conflicts such as the Horn of Africa and the Western Sahara?

HOLLINGS: I am in favor of regional solutions to regional problems, to whatever extent possible. We, as a nation, bear an important responsibility in providing leadership in the foreign policy area. However, we cannot resolve all crises, and certainly not unilaterally. There are some lessons to be learned from the Central American situation. It is in our own self-interest to encourage more active involvement on the part of the troubled area's neutral neighbors and regional organizations in helping resolve complex regional problems.

What specific changes in existing immigration and refugee laws and practice would your administration implement? What treatment would be accorded Haitian and other black refugees?

HOLLINGS: I supported the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, which the Senate approved during the last Congress and again this year. The House has not yet approved it. If passed, this law will not please everybody, but there is no ideal solution, and we need to proceed with a reasonably sensible approach. That means rectifying the status of the three to six million illegal immigrants living in this country. Their current status denies them basic human

rights, subjects them to exploitation, and creates an underclass which does not share in our national values. Equally important, we must gain effective control of our borders. Our immigration policy must be humane. But it must be based on a determination to assert our sovereignty. The proper way to deal with the feelings of economic despair in the Third World is to promote economic development there, not to bring those populations here.

As for sanctions against employers, these will have to be monitored as they are implemented to make sure they do not have an adverse and discriminatory effect.

As for Haitian refugees, they represent a special problem for us, much as do refugees from El Salvador. There are both economic emigres and political refugees leaving Haiti. We cannot accept all the economic emigres who wish to come here. But we feel a certain responsibility to political refugees. Communist dictatorships are not alone in practicing political persecution and current definitions of political refugee status may not fit reality. We need to examine our policies in this area to determine what would be the most effective and thoughtful way to proceed. □



WALTER F. MONDALE

Most recent public office: Vice President of the United States from 1977 to 1981

Biographical Information:

Born: January 5, 1928 in Ceylon, Minnesota

Education: Minnesota public schools; Macalester College; University of Minnesota, B.A.; University of Minnesota Law School, LL.B.

Career: Partner, Winston and Strawn Law Firm (D.C.) 1981 to present; Appointed to the U.S. Senate in 1964. Elected to the Senate in 1966 and served until 1976.

Senate Committees: Finance; Labor and Public Welfare; Chairman, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs; Special Committee on Aging; Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities; Chairman, Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity.

Appointed Minnesota Attorney General in May 1960; elected to that office in November 1960.

Recent Election Information: Ran for reelection as vice president with Jimmy Carter in 1980; the Carter-Mondale ticket was defeated by Ronald Reagan and George Bush. Carter and Mondale won forty-one percent of the vote.

Walter Mondale announced his candidacy for President of the United States on February 21, 1983.

If South Africa continues to block progress toward United Nations supervised elections in Namibia and the dismantlement of *apartheid* at home, would your administration support the imposition of comprehensive United Nations sanctions against South Africa? If not, what measures would you be prepared to take?

MONDALE: Two years after the Reagan administration reversed our policies in southern Africa, their policy has produced few positive results. Rather than directly confronting the difficulties South Africa poses for American interests in southern Africa, they instituted "constructive engagement." They proposed to turn South Africa around by offering a series of unilateral concessions. It is hardly surprising that the United States has gotten nothing in return.

When I met with former Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna in 1977, I made it clear to him that South Africa must allow all its people to share fully in the political life and future of the country. *Apartheid* is antithetical to our most basic values. Tolerating or ignoring it is not an acceptable American policy.

As President, I would press South Africa for meaningful action. I would make certain the South Africans understood that if they did not make progress on Namibia and *apartheid*, we would be prepared to use sanctions in cooperation with other nations. We should also be prepared to employ a range of unilateral measures, such as restrictions in the areas of exports, nuclear materials, and air traffic.

Finally, as President I would move to restore the trust that the Carter-Mondale administration had been able to create between the United States and black Africa. Working together, we were able to bring about majority rule in Zimbabwe and real movement toward independence for Namibia. The distance the Reagan administration has put between itself and black Africa has encouraged South Africa to assume that we will no longer pressure them relentlessly to change. "Constructive engagement" has merely emboldened South Africa to delay leaving Namibia and to destabilize neighboring Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe.

By making it clear that we stand with black Africa against these strategies, we can greatly increase South Africa's incentive to change course.

The United States is the only major Western power that does not recognize Angola. Would your administration normalize relations with Angola?

MONDALE: Angola presents an important opportunity for the United States. Our ability to work with Angolan leaders has become central to reaching a satisfactory agreement over Namibia. In my judgment, our current policy is wrong.

It is highly desirable to obtain the withdrawal of Cuban combat troops from Angola, but I do not believe that linking a settlement in Namibia to this withdrawal is an effective way of achieving either goal. Rather, a free and independent Namibia would probably be the most powerful argument against the continued presence of Cuban troops. The Reagan administration's insistence that withdrawal of Cuban troops precede South African conces-

sions on Namibia virtually guarantees that the Cubans will remain indefinitely.

We should be willing to sit down and work out an acceptable basis for relations with Angola. Our failure to do this has certainly hurt us, as the current Namibia stalemate demonstrates. And refusing to talk with the Angolans makes little sense in light of the fact that all of our allies and friends have normal relations with them. We should at least try to communicate with all other nations. A Mondale administration would begin that process with Angola.

Would your administration seek a normalization of relations with Cuba? If not, why not? What else would your propose?

MONDALE: President Reagan came into office determined to solve the problems of Central America by going to the "source"—Cuba. Since then, the problems of Central America have grown worse, and by the State Department's own estimate, Cuba has received more arms shipments from the Soviet Union than in any previous time since the Cuban missile crisis.

The Reagan administration has refused to talk to Cuba. We have very serious problems and very important objectives—none of which can be accomplished without talking. We have security objectives in stopping Cuban subversion and intervention and Cuban support for Soviet military objectives abroad. We have interests—which this administration has apparently forgotten—in human rights. We have economic and other concerns. All these problems will be difficult to resolve, but the minimal first step is to start talking.

How would your administration's policies toward Grenada and Nicaragua differ from those of the Reagan administration?

MONDALE: In March of 1981, former Secretary of State Alexander Haig insisted that Nicaragua had not been "lost" to the Communists and that there were still "a number of very important democratic elements seeking change in Nicaragua." It is harder to make such a statement today. By pursuing a confrontational policy toward Nicaragua, the Reagan administration has unwittingly strengthened the hands of the most extreme Marxist-Leninists and opened the way to the repression of almost all moderate groups in Nicaragua. The Reagan administration's strategy has hurt our democratic friends in Nicaragua, and it has helped our enemies by giving them an excuse for their own failures and a propaganda justification for their repression.

The problems of the region are not just the product of outside intervention, as the administration contends, nor should we attempt to solve them through American military intervention. These problems are the result of generations of militarism, poverty, and injustice, which the United States has not always been quick enough to oppose. We have ignored these problems for too long, and then have responded inappropriately to the crises that inevitably have arisen.

I strongly support the efforts of Latin American democracies in the *Cantadora* group to bring peace to the

troubled region of Central America through negotiations. And I would favor an important assistance program to help these countries to recover and make the kind of economic progress of which they are capable.

In the case of Grenada, the Reagan administration has lost any and all sense of proportion. Grenada is a tiny island of 100,000 people—smaller in size and population than most towns in the U.S. The Reagan administration's belligerent rhetoric has not only made the U.S. look ludicrous; it has made the Grenadan government seem heroic, and it has antagonized our friends in the region.

The departure from the democratic traditions of the eastern Caribbean by the Bishop regime is a serious cause for concern to Grenada's neighbors—all of whom remain democratic—and to the U.S., but it does not represent a global threat to the U.S. Without in the least relaxing our support for civil liberties and democratic elections, we should explore possibilities for improving relations with this small island nation.

TransAfrica ought to be commended for trying to facilitate a dialogue with the Bishop regime.

Our best chance of defeating communism in the Caribbean and in Central America is to ally ourselves with those who share our democratic values. That means opposing the extremism of the right as well as the left. And it means doing everything we can to strengthen and assist the forces of democracy. When peasants ask for land, when journalists ask for free speech, when politicians ask for the right to peacefully organize, when the victims of torture ask for justice—the United States must be at their side. A Mondale administration would ensure that U.S. policy reflects these concerns.

Would your administration support increasing levels of development assistance to Africa?

MONDALE: A solid relationship with the nations of Africa is important to us. To achieve it, we must play a substantial role in fostering Africa's economic development. During the Carter-Mondale administration, U.S. economic and technical assistance to Africa more than doubled, from \$300 million to well over \$700 million. The Reagan administration, on the other hand, has increased military assistance while reducing vital development aid. Among the important consequences of this trend has been a sharp reduction in the funds available to support the highly effective programs of American voluntary agencies in the developing world.

This policy is terribly shortsighted. By now we should have learned that instability throughout the world thrives on hunger and grinding poverty. Of the world's thirty poorest countries, twenty are in Africa.

We must respond to Africa's economic problems, not only to promote human decency, but also from an enlightened concern for our own long-term interests. If we want an Africa capable of buying American cars or grain, if we want an Africa that sees us as a partner and endorses our values and objectives, we must increase our contribution to Africa's development. We must undertake this foreign assistance, not as a dole, but as an investment in the future. Aid must go to the poorest and neediest regions of the continent, not just to those countries defined as strategically important to the United States.

Currently inflated levels of military aid tend to desta-

bilize Africa by escalating the East-West conflict. Development assistance, coupled with prudent diplomacy, will be much more effective in fostering peace and security on the continent.

What is your position on the Caribbean Basin Initiative? In what specific ways would your administration modify it?

MONDALE: The U.S. has important interests in assisting the countries in the region to develop self-sustaining economies. The C.B.I. could have been an effective regional development initiative, but it has been damaged by the administration's inept presentation and handling.

The initial proposal showed for the first time the Reagan administration's recognition that the crisis in the region is caused not just by outside intervention, but also by indigenous social and economic problems. However, by failing to build on existing regional institutions, the Reagan administration turned what could have been an important multilateral development tool into a unilateral program enmeshed in the administration's short-sighted and misguided approach to the region. This discouraged support for the program among Democrats, such as the Congressional Black Caucus, who in the past have played key leadership roles in promoting development assistance for the Caribbean. It also placed proposed recipients in the awkward position of appearing to endorse Ronald Reagan's world view.

Still, I believe a development initiative directed toward the Caribbean is necessary and could be important if there were some changes in our approach. Realistic participation by the smallest nations in the region is not possible unless we increase aid for basic infrastructure; private investment is not likely without it. Secondly, the U.S. should encourage regional integration rather than undermining regional institutions like the Caribbean Development Bank. Third, the U.S. should promote jobs and self-sufficiency by encouraging agricultural development and labor intensive investments.

What position would your administration take on African regional conflicts such as the Horn of Africa and the Western Sahara?

MONDALE: A Mondale administration would seek to prevent the intervention of outside forces who exploit African regional conflicts for their own benefit. We would understand the complex historical background of conflicts such as exist in the Horn and the Western Sahara. Where we discerned Soviet exploitation of such conflicts, we would join with African allies to pressure the Soviets to withdraw.

African nations oppose foreign intervention in their regional conflicts. I would have the U.S. join with them, if invited, to assist the Organization of African Unity in fulfilling its mandate to find a peaceful solution to conflict in the region. The OAU is seized with the problems of the Horn and the Western Sahara at this time and is seeking to forge a settlement based upon the principles of (a) acceptance of pre-independence borders, (b) self-determination, (c) non-intervention, and (d) settlement through negotiations rather than violence. In my judgment, these OAU principles form a sound basis for a settlement. While making our own position clear, however,

we should not intervene in OAU deliberations in ways that divide the Africans or obstruct their chosen processes.

What specific changes in existing immigration and refugee laws and practice would your administration implement? What treatment would be accorded Haitian and other black refugees?

MONDALE: America is diverse because we have been the most open and generous nation on earth. Each year we accept more immigrants and refugees than the rest of the world combined. I believe we must continue this historic policy. To slam the door on immigration—as some have suggested—would be to deny our past and impoverish our future.

There continues to be an intense debate over reform of the immigration laws in the Congress. Rather than offering specific changes in the law, let me share with you some of the principles that I believe ought to guide our efforts.

First, we must move toward legalizing the status of most individuals currently working and residing within our borders, to guarantee their basic human rights and fair treatment in our society.

Second, we must recognize our special relations with nations near us.

Third, we must reject all attempts—such as the Reagan administration's guestworker initiative—to turn the clock back to the days of the *bracero* program.

Fourth, our immigration laws must be publicly accept-

able and enforceable. But enforcement must be consistent with the civil liberties of all. Last year's nationwide "Operation Jobs" dragnet was an affront to every Hispanic in this country.

Fifth, immigration is a national responsibility. I was pleased by the Supreme Court's decision requiring states to provide public education for all children—whatever the origin and status of their parents. But this Constitutional requirement should be backed by federal assistance to those states that will incur large new costs as they carry out their legal duties.

Finally, the challenge of immigration cannot be addressed just within our borders. American foreign policy must work for a world in which no one is compelled by poverty or fear to leave the land of his birth.

That means support for economic development. We should provide the nations of this hemisphere more schools, more fertilizer, more rural roads—not more guns and more missiles.

It means an all-out effort to prevent the collapse of the international banking and financial system and enhance the capacity of developing countries to service their huge debts.

And most of all, it means an American policy that works for peace and reconciliation throughout the strife-torn nations of the region.

Under whatever immigration law the Mondale administration is governed, we will administer the law to provide equal treatment to black refugees. Racism has no more legitimacy in the application of the immigration law than it has elsewhere in our society, and I will not permit or tolerate it. □

TRANSAFRICA FORUM

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