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DESTABILIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

On December 9, 1982 helicopters dropped a heavily armed force of one hundred South African commandos into Maseru, Lesotho. The commando force hit twelve separate sites in and around Maseru, using bazookas, machine guns, grenades, and incendiary devices to blast through doors, demolish houses, and kill those inside. Most of the forty-two victims of this raid were black South African refugees. Other victims were Lesotho women and children who happened to be in or near target houses.

The raid on Lesotho is but one of many examples of what Congressman Howard Wolpe has described as a "dangerous development of escalating instability" in southern Africa. As the countries in southern Africa have attained majority rule, Pretoria has engaged in a systematic and sustained campaign of military and economic destabilization throughout the region. The destruction of human beings and vital economic installations has been enormous in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. South Africa's aggression has even extended as far as the far-flung Seychelles.

Despite protests from the target countries and condemnation from the international community, South Africa continues to threaten its neighbors with economic reprisals and military strikes with impunity. Indeed, although the Reagan administration claims to be interested in restoring "regional peace and stability," it has done little—if anything—to raise the costs of South African aggression.

This ISSUE BRIEF will discuss these and related issues, beginning with an interview with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda conducted by TransAfrica Forum's Executive Director, Randall Robinson. □

How would you describe the South African efforts to destabilize the adjoining countries?

KAUNDA: Perhaps, the place to begin is my recent meeting with Prime Minister Botha. We, as Frontline countries, continue to observe the policy worked out by African member-states of the OAU in Lusaka, which has been called the "Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa." We recognize the right of the white people in southern Africa to live as ordinary human beings. It is not the black majority that has rejected the white minority. It is the white minority in control of political power, of economic power, of social and cultural power, of scientific and technological power, and of defense and security power who have rejected the majority.

We can only conclude that by doing what they are do-

ing the racist South African government wants to push back the line of genuinely independent states, to create puppet states which they will be able to control, and thereby to rob the indigenous peoples of these countries of the genuine independence which they enjoy today.

Every country in southern Africa today has suffered in one way or another the destabilization process. Angola has been attacked several times. Even now as we are speaking, there are racist troops on Angolan soil. Botswana has come under attack from time to time, so they suffer from the same destabilization process. In Lesotho the same thing occurs: racist puppets attacked the Lesotho's Prime Minister's home and ran away into South Africa.

IT IS NOT NELSON MANDELA NOR OLIVER TAMBO . . . WHO ARE GOING TO BRING COMMUNISM TO SOUTH AFRICA. BOTHA AND HIS SUPPORTERS ARE GOING TO BRING COMMUNISM—WHICH THE U.S. FEARS SO MUCH—TO SOUTH AFRICA.

In Mozambique they have organized thousands of puppets, who they have sent to destabilize the government. There is a serious attempt to overthrow the government as they are doing in Angola. In Swaziland a different type of destabilization continues. In Zambia twice they have trained terrorists to overthrow our government—a government elected by the people of Zambia. In Zimbabwe they have taken over Muzorewa's gangsters, and they are training them now. As you can see, there is not one country among the Frontline States that has not in one way or another faced this continuing program of destabilization by racist South Africa.



Staff Photo

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda

How would you describe the difference in South African behavior before and since the election of the Reagan administration?

KAUNDA: It is difficult to say whether or not there has been any difference in approach by the South Africans to our situation in southern Africa. The only way in which change could be measured is in relation to certain actions South Africa might take. They *could* solve the Namibian issue by withdrawing from the country and by allowing the people of Namibia to elect their own government and to live in peace thereafter. They *could* also stop this process of destabilization to which I referred earlier. Therefore, I cannot say with a clear conscience that there has been any change because I have not seen it. Moreover, I haven't seen anything to make me believe that there will be some change to come.

Why did you decide to meet with Prime Minister Botha?

KAUNDA: I have said before that if the problem is not solved quickly it is going to explode very violently. If it should explode, it is going to make the French Revolution look like a Sunday morning children's picnic. Apart from the 24 million people in South Africa, it will affect everyone in southern Africa when it explodes. We are all in a small canoe sailing on the Zambezi River. We are moving toward cataracts very soon. If this small canoe capsizes, we all will perish.

Never before, have we had a situation in which the "haves" are all of one color and a minority while the "have nots" are all of one color and a majority. This very powerful minority is supported by the powerful forces which we humanists call forces of exploitative international capitalism and its off-shoots of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, zionism, facism, racism, and *apartheid*.

Has American investment in South Africa underpinned their capacity to destabilize their neighbors?

KAUNDA: Precisely. I am not accusing the U.S. government, or the West German government, or the French government. Monopoly multinationals are not under the control of any government; they are powers unto themselves. They have invested in South Africa because they want to make huge profits. That suits the Boers in South Africa. They do not want change there at all.

As has happened in Zimbabwe, in Zambia, in Mozambique, and in Angola, when the people themselves take power, the distribution of wealth takes on a new character. Governments of the people, by the people, and for the people are established. They are going to produce wealth and to distribute it to fit the needs and requirements of all the people. This is what the Boers do not want to see. This is not what monopoly capitalists would like to see happen in South Africa. So the two of them have come together to exploit the masses of South Africa's people.

How should the United States government respond to South African destabilization attempts? What is wrong with current American policy?

KAUNDA: I know of no government today which clearly has as much influence with the South African government as the U.S. government has. Therefore, the U.S. has a very grave responsibility with respect to the explosive southern African situation. I am not in a position to lecture your government as to how to go about bringing majority rule to South Africa; but even in the selfish interest of the investor, they have to do something and do something quickly. Time is not with us; time is running short.

It is not Nelson Mandela nor Oliver Tambo nor other leaders in South African jails or who are outside South Africa fighting for their rights who are going to bring communism to South Africa. Botha and his supporters are going to bring communism—which the U.S. fears so much—to South Africa.

Nothing can stop the young people of South Africa from fighting for their independence. Western capitals will not offer them weapons to fight against their own investment in South Africa. The only countries that provide training and weapons are Eastern, socialist countries whose ideology is Marxism-Leninism.

Western countries cannot have their cake and eat it too. When South African young people train in use of these weapons, obviously ideology follows. When we are dealing with the question of communism, we should look not at the effect but at the course. Those who do not want communist ideology to envelope South Africa must remove the cause—the cancer that is killing South Africa.

The Russians are not responsible; they have no way to get into South Africa except via freedom fighters. To stop the freedom fighters from going to Russia or to China, one must stop the cause that makes them leave South Africa and train in the usage of those weapons.

Will change come to South Africa in the next ten or fifteen years?

KAUNDA: I don't give those people more than five years before an explosion takes place. Oh no! We don't have that much time. If South Africa does not change now, an explosion is inevitable. Watch the next three, four, or five years. They are very key in that situation.

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
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ANGOLA



Although none of the countries in southern Africa has escaped Pretoria's destabilization attempts, Angola has been particularly victimized. Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos

has estimated that South Africa has subjected his country to more than \$10 billion in "material damage" since 1975. Whether this estimate includes such incidents as the seizing of more than \$200 million in arms during a major South African operation last year, attacks conducted solely by the anti-government National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), or joint UNITA-South Africa attacks is unclear. At any rate, the extent of the damage has been undeniably tremendous.

South Africa's attacks on Angola have been numerous and have incorporated at least four types of activities:

- Attacks on South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and African National Congress (ANC) refugee camps.
- Financial and logistical support for UNITA in waging its armed insurrection against the Angolan government.
- Sabotage of economic targets such as refineries, oil pipelines, and bridges.

- Bombing, military invasion, and occupation of important parts of southern Angola.

Pretoria's most recent offensive against Angola began in June 1982 in the midst of the delicate Namibia negotiations. According to the South African commander in Namibia, Major General Charles Lloyd, his troops would remain in Angola until a cease-fire in the Namibian conflict has been declared.

The foray into southern Angola, beginning on June 11th, was the most intense since the South African invasion of the preceding year in which it claimed to have killed more than one thousand SWAPO guerillas. On July 16th, the South African forces attacked two suspected SWAPO bases at Evale and Ionde which were eighty miles inside Angolan territory only to find them deserted. On August 10th, Lloyd's troops clashed with SWAPO guerillas further to the north at Tecamutete, killing more than one hundred insurgents according to South African reports.

It is ironic, of course, that South Africa sees this type of invasion as a means of forcing the Angolan's hands with respect to the presence of Cuban troops. If enough pressure can be applied, they reason, then Angola can be forced to send the Cuban troops home. On December 8th, the two governments held their first publicly acknowledged discussions since Angolan independence. But Angolan officials have little reason to trust South Africa. While the two governments negotiated, South Africa was preparing for its now infamous invasion of Lesotho.

MOZAMBIQUE



For the past several years, South Africa has also been waging an undeclared war against neighboring Mozambique. In January 1981 South African forces attacked the suburbs

of Maputo, the Mozambican capital. In August 1982 Ruth First, an outspoken critic of apartheid, was assassinated by a letter bomb mailed to her office at the University of Eduardo Mondlane. Several days later, South African troops landed in southern Mozambique.

In an ominous warning, South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan has since stated that his country might find it *necessary* to initiate a "Lebanese-type invasion" of Mozambique. Indeed, the Mozambican representative to the United Nations has reported a massive build-up of South African troops and military equipment along its border.

As in Angola, Pretoria's principal weapon against Mozambique has been an anti-government guerrilla movement, the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Both former Rhodesian intelligence chief Ken Flowers and former South African spy Gordon Winter claim credit for their respective governments for the organization of the MNR. In either case, from 1976 until the sign-

ing of the Lancaster House Agreement, Rhodesia provided the MNR with arms, bases, and logistics support along the Mozambican border. When Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, the MNR's base of operation shifted to South Africa. The MNR has inflicted substantial damage on the strategic southern provinces of Mozambique as a means of discouraging both Zimbabwe and Botswana from exporting their commodities through Maputo. As its military activity has intensified, the MNR repeatedly has destroyed bridges, railroad lines, communal villages, and priority development projects.

South Africa's involvement in the MNR goes beyond planning and providing war materials. "Boer" casualties discovered when MNR bases have been overrun, European advisors and instructors in MNR camps, and training of MNR forces by South African military bases in the Transvaal are evidence of the extent of South Africa's involvement. MNR forces are resupplied regularly at night by South Africa. South African planes flying inside Mozambique provide the MNR with detailed information concerning Mozambican troop movements.

Despite this compelling evidence to the contrary, South Africa has disavowed all links with the MNR. It maintains that its threats and its military activities against Mozambique are merely necessary countermeasures in response to ANC attacks launched from Mozambique and to Mozambique's decision to deploy sophisticated weapons along the South African border.

ZIMBABWE



When Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, South Africa lost its only remaining ally in southern Africa. Once that country attained majority rule, it also became a principal target of Pretoria's

wrath. At an assembly meeting of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific European Economic Community held in Harare during February 1982, Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe denounced South Africa's "systematic policy of destabilization" against his government. Mugabe charged that between five and six thousand mercenaries, many of them former members of Rhodesia's security forces or former supporters of Bishop Muzorewa, were being trained by the South African defense forces for infiltration into Zimbabwe. Moreover, Mugabe implicated Pretoria in an attempt by the Rhodesian Front to overthrow his government when sections of the white community in Matabeleland in western Zimbabwe tried to "press the local black population into a secession movement."

Between March and September 1982, the South Africa supported MNR sabotaged the oil pipeline between the Mozambican port of Beira and Zimbabwe twice and immobilized the railway for seventeen days. In addition, the road between Malawi and Zimbabwe suffered six ambushes within the same period.

In August 1982 Zimbabwe uncovered further evidence of South Africa's aggression. A clash took place between South African soldiers and the Zimbabwean military forces several miles inside Zimbabwe near the borders of Mozambique and South Africa. Three white South African soldiers, who formerly had been soldiers in the Rhodesian military, were killed while black South Africans fled, leaving behind an array of Soviet bloc weapons and supplies identified as being from South Africa and Ireland. The three dead soldiers were not members of the MNR as had been speculated. According to Zimbabwean officials, these men had been trained in sabotage and had been part of South Africa's "preparation for an invasion" of Zimbabwe.

Although General Constand Viljoen, the chief of South African military forces, initially denied knowledge of this incident, he later confirmed that the South African troops had been on an "unauthorized mission." Several South African Defense Force members, however, have declared that they were deployed *regularly* in raids on neighboring black states, including Zimbabwe, and that this raid was, therefore, not "unauthorized." The soldiers' disclosure was not reflective of their higher social conscience but rather resulted from their concern for their colleagues' families who would be unable to collect insurance or pension benefits if the official version of the mission were true. The disaffected soldiers also revealed that a destabilization center exists at Pretoria's defense headquarters whose sole purpose is the weakening of the region's black states.

SEYCHELLES



The Seychelles, a group of about fifty-eight tiny, impoverished, and largely uninhabited islands, is situated approximately a thousand miles off the east coast of Africa. It is, therefore,

an unlikely victim of South African destabilization attempts. Nonetheless, on November 25, 1981 a heavily armed band of mercenaries attempted to overthrow the Seychelles government. The target of the attempted coup was the Socialist regime of President France Albert Rene; the intent was to reinstate the pro-Western former president James Mancham who had been ousted in 1977. The forty-five South African, British, and American mercenaries, led by "Mad Mike" Hoare, left South Africa in a luxury bus headed for Swaziland. From there they boarded a Royal Swazi National Airways flight for the Seychelles main island of Mahe to execute the South African plot.

At Pointe Larue Airport the coup attempt was discovered by a customs officer who found an assault rifle in the false bottom of a suitcase. Although the Security Force quickly closed in the mercenaries, most escaped after hijacking an Air India Boeing 707. Hoare ordered

the Air India pilot to fly to South Africa, but the embarrassed South African government refused landing rights at Johannesburg airport. However, the plane was allowed to land at Durban Airport where it was surrounded by police who arrested the mercenaries.

The trials following the coup attempt—both in the Seychelles and in South Africa—revealed unquestionable South African complicity in the coup attempt. During his trial for hijacking in South Africa, Hoare confessed that the South African government was aware of the coup and that the Defense Force had supplied the mercenaries with weapons. Georg Schroeder, a German ex-mercenary who now runs an export business in South Africa, disclosed that he had informed "the authorities" about the coup. Relatives of two mercenaries reported that the men had received a message of encouragement from Prime Minister Botha himself on the eve of their departure.

Among those tried in the Seychelles was Martin Dolincheck, a "senior officer" of South Africa's national intelligence service. Dolincheck refused legal aid at his trial, arguing that his government should arrange for his defense.

The South African government sentenced Hoare and his fellow mercenaries to sentences ranging from six months to ten years in prison for hijacking. They were never tried for attempting to overthrow the government of the Seychelles.

THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC)

“ . . . We call on governments, international institutions, and voluntary agencies to give priority to increasing financial resources to support southern African efforts toward economic liberation and independent economic development. This we believe is the route to genuine interdependence and represents the best hope for a just and cooperative future for the region as a whole.”

Heads of Government for SADCC Countries
April 1, 1980


On April 1, 1980 the Heads of Government of nine southern African countries met in Lusaka, Zambia and signed “Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation.” The countries included: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The document served as a statement of their “commitment to pursue policies aimed at the economic liberation and integrated development of [their] national economies.” The organization they formed at this meeting, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), would aim toward reducing their economic dependence on South Africa and substituting the mutual interdependence of southern African economies.

In struggling to promote economic development after attaining majority rule, these countries had learned that economic liberation from South Africa was as vital as political liberation from their colonizers. Although they had achieved some measure of political freedom, their economies still were conceived and organized as functions of South Africa. For example, by the end of the Smith regime, Zimbabwe’s economy was, for all practical purposes, an appendage of South Africa’s. South Africa was its leading export market, offering preferential tariff rates and providing thirty percent of its imports. Nearly one hundred percent of Zimbabwean exports and imports not destined to or emanating from South Africa had to pass through South African ports.

Similarly, tiny Lesotho has few salable resources other than the labor of its 1.3 million citizens, 141,000 of whom work in the gold mines and on the farms of the Orange Free State, an adjacent South African province. Should Pretoria stop the flow of Lesotho’s workers, a diplomat has warned that, “the government and perhaps the country wouldn’t last a week” because forty percent of Lesotho’s GNP is derived from wages earned in South Africa.

Six SADCC countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) are land-locked and must ship their imports and exports through South African ports. Drought-stricken countries have been dependent on South Africa for food. Fuel for some countries must be routed by rail through South Africa.

In response to their pervasive and untenable dependence on South Africa, the nine members of SADCC have created a regional organization which will function alongside the development apparatus of each member state. SADCC’s purpose is to decrease South Africa’s economic power over the countries and to increase their mutual cooperation. It will help members plan and implement necessary development projects which a



country would be unable—either logistically or financially—to carry out. SADCC countries will integrate their regional productive capabilities and will make their development decisions in a cooperative manner.

Six functional areas of cooperation have been identified for special attention by SADCC, including:

- Transportation and communications.
- Agriculture and food security.
- Manpower training.
- Industrial capacity.
- Energy needs.
- A secretariat.

One SADCC member has primary responsibility for coordinating activities for each of these areas. Other areas of cooperation are: a development fund, health, mining, soil conservation, and security planning.

At the organizing conference in 1980, SADCC members agreed that strengthening the communication and transportation links among them must be a priority if all other forms of regional cooperation are to occur. Nearly \$600 million was pledged by foreign donors for transportation projects which include upgrading Mozambican railroad lines and increasing the port capacities of Beira and Maputo. Consequently, the SADCC transportation network has been successful in redirecting international commerce away from South African ports. Zimbabwe, for example, exported thirty million tons through Maputo in 1980 and more than two hundred million tons in 1981, in addition to 166 million tons through the adjacent port of Matola.

South Africa considers SADCC to be a significant development worthy of its “special attention.” It has, therefore, mounted a campaign of economic reprisals in coordination with its military destabilization of SADCC member states. South Africa withdrew locomotives and technicians it had loaned to Zimbabwe during the Smith government, ended preferential trading, and abruptly repatriated black Zimbabwean workers. At a meeting of South African security officials and the MNR in 1980, it was decided that transportation links between SADCC countries should be regularly sabotaged as has obviously been the case.

Although the nine leaders of SADCC states jointly condemned South Africa for its policy of destabilization “aimed at SADCC member states,” Pretoria continues in its campaign against its neighbors. Only the full force of international pressure applied against that country is likely to deter South African aggression.

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